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Abstract
To ensure equal representation, the voting districts of a country
must be more or less of the same size. Designing such voting districts,
however, is not an easy task due to the fact that voting districts are
encompassed in administrative regions. Since the respective share of
an administrative region, i.e. the number of seats its entitled to based
on its population, is not necessarily an integer number, it is hard to
distribute the seats in a fair way. The arising fair distribution problem
is called the apportionment problem. Proportionality of the alloca-
tion is the most important, but not the only factor of a fair solution.
Monotonicity related diﬃculties, administrative and demographic is-
sues make the problem more complex. We provide an overview of the
classical apportionment methods as well as the Leximin Method - a
new apportionment technique designed to comply with the recommen-
dation made by the Venice Commission. We discuss the properties of
apportionments and test the most prominent methods on real data.
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1 Introduction
In a representative democracy citizens exert their inﬂuence via elected rep-
resentatives. Representation will be fair if the citizens have more or less the
same (indirect) inﬂuence, that is, if each representative stands for the same
number of citizens. This idea was explicitly declared in the 14th Amendment
of the US Constitution, but dates back even earlier to the times of the Roman
Republic.
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole num-
ber of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. (14th
Amendment, Section 2)
Establishing electoral districts with equal numbers of voters becomes non-
trivial, when they must ﬁt into the existing administrative structure of a
country. For instance the distribution of three seats between two equally
populated regions will necessarily lead to inequalities. This example may
seem artiﬁcial, but under more realistic circumstances with many regions
and a high number of seats to be allocated the problem remains hard. The
general problem of allocating seats between regions in a fair way is known as
the apportionment problem.
Proportional apportionment is one, but not the only ingredient of fair
representation. Other, monotonicity-related issues  studying changes in
the allocation subject to changes in the input parameters  emerged in the
past 150 years. The most notable one is the so-called Alabama paradox.
During the 1880 US census the Chief Clerk of the Census Oﬃce considered
an enlargement of the House of Representatives and noted that moving from
299 to 300 seats would result in a loss of a seat for the State Alabama.
This anomaly together with the later discovered population and new state
paradoxes pressed the legislators to revise the apportionment rules again
and again. The currently used seat distribution method is free from such
anomalies. However, it does not satisfy the so called Hare-quota, a basic
guarantee of proportionality (Balinski and Young, 1975).
While virtually every Western-type democracy adopted the principle laid
down in the US Constitution, their approaches diﬀer on how they deal with
the arising paradoxes and anomalies.
The European Commission for Democracy through Law, better known as
the Venice Commission, a recent entrant to this debate, published a compre-
hensive guidebook on good electoral laws in 2002. The Code of Good Prac-
tice in Electoral Matters (Venice Commission, 2002)  consequently used
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in reviewing Albania's and Estonia's electoral law in 2011 (OSCE/ODIHR,
2011; Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR, 2011) and forming an appar-
ent model to the modiﬁcations Hungary introduced to its electoral law in
2012 , contains original recommendations for a good practice of apportion-
ment.
Equality in voting power, where the elections are not be-
ing held in one single constituency, requires constituency bound-
aries to be drawn in such a way that seats in the lower cham-
bers representing the people are distributed equally among the
constituencies, in accordance with a speciﬁc apportionment cri-
terion, e.g., the number of residents in the constituency, the num-
ber of resident nationals (including minors), the number of reg-
istered electors, or possibly the number of people actually voting
... Constituency boundaries may also be determined on the basis
of geographical criteria and the administrative or indeed historic
boundary lines, which often depend on geography ... The maxi-
mum admissible departure from the distribution criterion adopted
depends on the individual situation, although it should seldom
exceed 10% and never 15%, except in really exceptional circum-
stances (a demographically weak administrative unit of the same
importance as others with at least one lower-chamber represen-
tative, or concentration of a speciﬁc national minority). (Venice
Commission, 2002, 1315 in Section 2.2)
The recommendation leaves some details open. Does the maximum ad-
missible departure refer to the diﬀerence of population between any two
constituencies or the diﬀerence of the population of any constituency from
the average constituency size? The latter approach is more permissive and
more common around the world (see Table 1). Indeed, the ﬁnal version of
the 2012 electoral law of Hungary replaced the former with 10-15% departure
limits with the latter with 15-20% departure limits. Without this signiﬁcant
relaxation the rule was mathematically impossible to satisfy (Biró et al.,
2012).
Similar thresholds exist in many other countries (Table 1), but the val-
ues diﬀer greatly from country to country. The strictest limits are set in
the United States that permits no inequalities by its Constitution. Zero-
tolerance, however, remains a theoretical objective. Real life is widely diﬀer-
ent: the constituencies of Montana are almost twice as large as the ones in
Rhode Island. Assuming that the voters' inﬂuence is proportional to the size
of the constituencies, the voters of Rhode Island have 88% more inﬂuence
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Country Thresholds Country Thresholds
Albania 5% New Zealand 5%
Armenia 15% Papua New Guinea 20%
Australia 10% Singapore 30%
Canada 25% Ukraine 10%
Czech Republic 15% UK 5%
France 20% USA 0%
Germany 15% Yemen 5%
Hungary 15% (20%) Zimbabwe 20%
Italy 10%
Table 1: Thresholds (thresholds under extraordinary circumstances) for the
maximum diﬀerence from the average constituency size (Handley, 2007).
than the voters of Montana. A shocking gap, but dwarfed by the diﬀerences
in Georgia where the electoral law of 1999 did not set rules about the sizes of
constituencies. The number of voters per (single-seat) constituencies ranged
from 3,600 in the Lent'ekhi or 4,200 in the Kazbegi districts to over 138,000
in Kutaisi City, hugely favouring voters in the former regions.
Setting a limit on the maximum departure from the average size is a very
natural condition, but already such a mild requirement conﬂicts with well-
established apportionment standards: for certain apportionment problems all
allocations that respect the given limits violate properties such as Hare-quota
and monotonicity (Biró et al., 2015). Furthermore, the recommendation of
the Venice Committee does not generally specify a unique solution, so it still
leaves possibilities of manipulation. This second problem may be overcome by
a new apportionment rule, constructed in the spirit of the recommendation.
The Leximin Method eﬃciently computes a solution where the diﬀerences
from the average size are lexicographically minimized (Biró et al., 2015).
In this chapter we survey the apportionment methods and the impact
of the latest policy recommendation by the Venice Commission. First, in
Section 2 we give an overview on the classical apportionment methods and
the Leximin Method, and discuss their properties. Then we illustrate the
usage of the Leximin Method compared to the solutions by the current legis-
lations from a wide range of countries. These examples are based on our own
calculations that in turn are made using information on voting systems and
population data gathered from a wide range of sources. The details together
with a systematic study of voting systems will be published elsewhere.
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2 Overview of Apportionment Methods
In this section we introduce the apportionment problem; we introduce and
characterise methods to solve it.
2.1 The Apportionment Problem
In a representative democracy higher level decisions are made by a group of
elected representatives. In most countries each representative speaks for citi-
zens living in a certain geographical area and is elected in one of several voting
districts or constituencies. Generally a constituency elects a single candi-
date, although in some countries, like Ireland or Singapore a constituency
may elect multiple representatives. Other countries, like the Netherlands or
Israel, has no non-trivial constituencies, but all representatives are elected
at the national level with no geographical attachment  we regard this as a
trivial case with a single constituency. Yet others have combinations of these
(Csató, 2015, 2016)  we will focus on the voting districts. The basis of
geographical representation is that people living in certain regions, such as
New Yorkers or Scotsmen are not just arbitrary voters, but people sharing
certain cultural or geographical interests. Constituencies are consequently
organised into geographical, political or administrative regions.
We look for a fair an proportional representation. However natural this
approach seems, it is not universal. The Cambridge Compromise, an academic-
driven proposal for a mathematical method to allocate the seats of the Eu-
ropean Parliament among the member states, for instance, takes proportion-
ality as only one of the aspects to be taken into account (Grimmett, 2012).
In weighted voting the weights are also not proportional. During the ne-
gotiations of the Lisbon Treaty that, among others, reformed voting in the
Council of the European Union the Jagellonian Compromise proposed to use
the Penrose square-root law, where the allocated weights are proportional to
the square root of populations (Penrose, 1946; Sªomczy«ski and yczkowski,
2006; Kóczy, 2012). While these are examples where proportionality is know-
ingly violated, but for the purposes of fairness, there are many voting systems
(Canada and Denmark are examples) where certain territories, such as rural
regions, or less populate states, are overrepresented by law.
Our interest thus lies in the allocation of representatives among these
regions in a fair way. Allocating seats among parties in party-list pro-
portional representation, the biproportional apportionment problem (Ricca
et al., 2017) or voting with multi-winner approval rules (Brill et al., 2017) is
analogous and the general problem of apportionment can go well beyond the
districting problem and can deal with the allocation of any ﬁnite, indivisible
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good among heterogenous claimants in a fair, proportional way. While the
methodology can be used, for instance for discrete clearing in the bankruptcy
literature (Csóka and Herings, 2016), in the following we keep the voting ter-
minology and also take such applications and examples. We assume that the
task is to allocate the seats of a legislature or House among several, n states
 and elegantly skip the problem of districting (Tasnádi, 2011; Puppe and
Tasnádi, 2015), the laying out of the actual districts, that can introduce addi-
tional ineﬃciencies. Before going any further, we formally deﬁne the problem
and introduce some of the best known methods to solve the apportionment
problem.
An apportionment problem (p, H) is a pair consisting a vector
p = (p1, p2, . . . , pn)
of state populations, where P =
∑n
i=1 pi is the population of the country and
H ∈ N+ denotes the number of seats in the House (where N+ = {1, 2, 3, . . . }).
Our task is to determine the non-negative integers a1, a2, . . . , an with
∑n
i=1 ai =
H representing the number of constituencies in states 1, 2, . . . , n.
Let p ∈ Nn+ and a ∈ Nn be the n-dimensional vectors that contain the
population sizes and the allotted number of seats, respectively. An appor-
tionment method or rule is a function M that assigns an allotment for each
apportionment problem (p, H). An apportionment method speciﬁes exactly
how many House seats each of the states gets. The resulting apportionment
is not necessarily unique although for a good method the multiplicity only
emerges in artiﬁcial examples. Let A = P
H
denote the average size of a con-
stituency. The fraction pi
P
H = pi
A
is called the respective share of state i. Let
δi be the diﬀerence in percentage, displayed by the constituencies of state i
and let di be the departure, its absolute value. Formally
δi =
pi
ai
− A
A
and di = |δi| (1)
Throughout the paper we will employ the following notation: let x,y ∈
Rn, we say that x ≥ y if xi ≥ yi for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
2.2 Apportionment Methods
The fundamental idea of apportionment methods is that a representative
should speak for the same number of voters irrespective of the state or re-
gion she represents. Ideally a state i should get a proportional part pi
P
H
of the seats. This number is the standard quota. If not all standard quo-
tas are integers and most of the time they are not, we must diverge from
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the ideal numbers. Rounding the numbers down does not immediately solve
the problem as the total number of seats to be distributed is ﬁxed, so if
the standard quota is rounded down for some, it must be rounded up for
others, immediately creating inequalities. Many of the best known methods
only diﬀer in rounding up or down the standard quotas diﬀerently. See also
(Ricca et al., 2017) where some remarkably diﬀerent methods coming from
a diﬀerent stream of literature are presented.
2.2.1 Largest Remainder Methods
The largest remainder methods all rely on the logic of calculating the price
of a seat in terms of the number of voters, allocating the fully paid seats.
The remaining seats are allocated to the states with the largest remainders,
that is, the states with the largest fractional seat. Several methods exist using
diﬀerent ways to calculate the price, the Hamilton method is the simplest
and best known.
The Hamilton method (also known as Hare-Niemeyer or Vinton method)
sets the price as the standard or Hare divisor DS = PH , which is the same
as the average constituency size A. By dividing the population of a state by
the standard divisor DS we calculate the ideal number of constituencies in
the given state. From this we can calculate how many seats does the state's
population suﬃce for: each state is guaranteed to get the integer part of the
quota, the lower quota. The remaining seats are distributed in the same way
as for other largest remainder methods.
We are not aware of a speciﬁcation of a tiebreaking rule when the re-
mainders are identical, although with real life data this is a non-issue. The
Hamilton method was the ﬁrst proposal to allocate the seats of the United
States Congress between states, but this was vetoed by president Washing-
ton.
Other largest remainder methods diﬀer in the way their quotas are cal-
culated. The Hagenbach-Bischoﬀ quota (Hagenbach-Bischoﬀ, 1888) is calcu-
lated with the divisor DH-B = PH+1 , while the Droop and Imperiali (named
after Belgian Senator Pierre Imperiali) quotas with the only very slightly
diﬀerent DD = b PH+1 +1c (Droop, 1881) and DI = PH+2 . The Droop quota is
typically used in single transferable vote systems, where voters rank candi-
dates and if their top choice has suﬃcient votes to get elected, the vote goes
to the second choice and so on. The Droop divisor is the lowest number sat-
isfying that the number of claimable resources, such as seats does not exceed
the House. In this sense the Hagenbach-Bischoﬀ and especially the Imperiali
method may allocate seats that must later be taken back.
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2.2.2 Divisor Methods
Divisor methods (sometimes called highest average or highest quotient meth-
ods) follow a slightly diﬀerent logic by adjusting the quotient itself. When
the (lower) quotas are calculated there will be some left-over seats. By low-
ering the divisor  eﬀectively the price of a seat  states will be able to
aﬀord more. Divisor methods are mathematically equivalent to procedural
apportionment methods such as e.g. the D'Hondt method, which distribute
seats one at a time to the state with the highest claim, then update the
claims after each iteration until all the seats are allocated.
The Jeﬀerson or D'Hondt method, introduced by Thomas Jeﬀerson in
1791 and by Victor D'Hondt in 1878 in two mathematically very diﬀerent,
though equivalent forms is the simplest of all divisor methods. Under the
Jeﬀerson method the standard divisor DS = PH is calculated. The lower
quotas generally do not add up to the size of the House, so in this method
the standard divisor is gradually lowered by trial and error until they do.
While this is not a precise mathematical algorithm, note that the modiﬁed
divisor will generally satisfy this for a whole range of values, so an appropriate
value is easy to ﬁnd.
The D'Hondt method uses the following claim function
D'Hondt method qHi (s) =
pi
s+ 1
showing how many voters would a representative, on average, represent if an
additional seat were given to the state i already having s seats.
Some voting systems use variants of the D'Hondt method that bias the
results in favour or against larger claimants, such as states with larger voting
population or parties with many votes in a party-list voting system. These
include the following
Adams method qAi (s) =
pi
s
Danish method qDi (s) =
pi
s+ 1/3
Huntington-Hill method/EP qHHi (s) =
pi√
s(s+ 1)
Sainte-Laguë/Webster method qSLi (s) =
pi
s+ 1/2
Imperiali method qIi(s) =
pi
s+ 2
Macau method qMi (s) =
pi
2s
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displaying an increasing bias against large states with the Adams, Danish
Huntington-Hill and Sainte-Laguë methods favouring large states more than
the D'Hondt, Imperiali or especially the Macau method (Marshall et al.,
2002; Bittó, 2017). The Huntington-Hill method, also known as the Method
of Equal Proportions (EP) is the method currently used in the United States
House of Representatives.
2.2.3 The Leximin Method
The Leximin Method (Biró et al., 2015) is fundamentally diﬀerent from the
methods discussed so far. While these were based on ﬁnding the standard
quota and then trying to ﬁnd a good way to round these numbers, the Lex-
imin Method looks at relative diﬀerences. It minimizes the absolute value
of the largest relative diﬀerence from the average constituency size  the
maximum departure  and does this in a recursive fashion.
To have a more precise deﬁnition, we need to introduce some terminology.
Lexicographic is like alphabetic ordering where words are compared letter-
by-letter and the ordering is based on the ﬁrst diﬀerence. When it comes to
real vectors the ordering is based on the ﬁrst coordinates where these vectors
diﬀer. Formally vector x ∈ Rm is lexicographically smaller than y ∈ Rm
(denoted by x ≺ y) if x 6= y and there exists a number 1 ≤ j ≤ m such that
xi = yi if i < j and xj < yj.
Returning to our model, given an apportionment problem (p, H) and an
allotment a, let ∆(a) denote a nonnegative n-dimensional vector, where
the diﬀerences di(a) are contained in a non-increasing order. A solution
a is said to be lexicographically minimal, or simply leximin, if there is no
other allotment a′ where ∆(a′) is lexicographically smaller than ∆(a). The
Leximin Method chooses an allocation of seats, such that the non-increasingly
ordered vector of diﬀerences is lexicographically minimal. This method is
somewhat more complex than the earlier ones, but while other methods make
sure that states do not get too many seats, the Leximin Method takes both
under- and overrepresentation into account. Perhaps it is not so obvious
here, but the method is well-deﬁned and Biró et al. (2015) gave an eﬃcient
algorithm to calculate it.
2.3 Properties and Paradoxes
There are several apportionment methods and while in most cases they all
produce nearly identical results, we would like to understand the reasons for
the small diﬀerences that may be observed. The way to argue in favour or
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against these methods is by looking at their properties. In the following we
list some properties that apportionment methods satisfy.
2.3.1 Quota
Exact proportional representation is seldom possible as the respective shares
of the states are hardly ever integer numbers. However if such a case occurs,
that is, the fractions ai =
pi
P
H are integers for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} then the
allotment a is said to have the exact quota property.
In any other case taking one of the nearest integers to the exactly pro-
portional share is a natural choice or at least some methods explicitly try
to allocate seats accordingly. An allotment a satisﬁes lower (upper) quotas,
if no state receives less (more) constituencies than the lower (upper) integer
part of its respective share, that is ai ≥
⌊
pi
P
H
⌋
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and
ai ≤
⌈
pi
P
H
⌉
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, respectively. An allotment satisﬁes the
Hare-quota or simply the quota property if it satisﬁes both upper and lower
quota.
Similarly, we say that an apportionment method M(p, H) satisﬁes lower
(upper) quota if for any apportionment problem (p,H),M(p, H)i ≥ bpiPHc or
M(p, H)i ≤ dpiPHe respectively for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and satisﬁes Hare-quota
if it satisﬁes both of them.
2.3.2 Monotonicity
Monotonicity properties describe how changes in the number of available
seats or the (relative) claims made by the states should aﬀect the number of
allocated seats.
House-monotonicity states that the individual states should not lose seats
when more seats are available in the House.
Deﬁnition 1. An apportionment methodM is house-monotonic ifM(p, H ′) ≥
M(p, H) for any apportionment problem (p, H) and House sizes H ′ > H.
A scenario where increasing the House size would decrease the number
of seats allotted to a state is often considered undesirable, perhaps even
paradoxical. An apportionment rule where this is possible is said to exhibit
the Alabama paradox referring to a historical occurrence of the phenomenon
for state Alabama. House-monotonic apportionment methods are free from
this paradox.
There is a related monotonicity requirement and an associated paradox
when populations are considered. The population paradox arises when the
population of two states increases at diﬀerent rates. Then it is possible that
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the state with more rapid growth actually loses seats to the state with slower
growth. Biró et al. (2015) present an example where the population paradox
emerges; Tasnádi (2008) surveys the emergence of this paradox historically
in the apportionment among parties in Hungary.
Deﬁnition 2. An apportionment ruleM is population-monotonic ifM(p′, H)i ≥
M(p, H)i for any House size H and population sizes p,p
′ such that p′i > pi,
p′j > pj and
p′i
pi
≥ p′j
pj
while p′k = pk for k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, k 6= i, j.
Note that there are several alternative deﬁnitions of this property. The
one presented here is slightly weaker than some others used in the literature
(Lauwers and Van Puyenbroeck, 2008; Balinski and Young, 1982). However,
as we will see even this weaker property is violated by some rules.
2.3.3 Departure from the Exact Quota
If it is not possible to distribute the seats according to the exact quota
there will be necessarily some inequality. Departure is the relative diﬀerence
between the average number of represented voters per representative in a
given state and nationwide.
Several countries specify an explicit limit on the permitted departure from
the average in their electoral law in accordance with the recommendation of
the Venice Commission (2002). An apportionment satisﬁes the q-permitted
departure property if all departures are smaller than the given limit q. Then
an apportionment method satisﬁes the admissible departure property if for
each apportionment problem, for which there exists an apportionment satis-
fying the permitted departure property, it produces such an apportionment.
Formally
An apportionment satisﬁes the Venice or Smallest maximum admissible
departure property if for apportionment problem it produces an apportion-
ment where the largest departure is the smallest. For a given apportionment
problem (p, H) let α(p,H) be the smallest maximum admissible departure that
can be achieved with an allotment, i.e.,
α(p,H) = min
a∈A(n,H)
max
i∈{1,...,n}
{di} (2)
where A(n,H) denotes the set of n-dimensional non-negative vectors for
which the sum of the coordinates is H.
Deﬁnition 3. An apportionment rule M satisﬁes the smallest maximum
admissible departure property if
∣∣∣∣ piM(p,H)i−AA ∣∣∣∣ ≤ α(p,H) for any apportionment
problem (p,H) and for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
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Table 2: A comparison of apportionment methods.
quota House population Venice
monotonicity monotonicity
Hamilton both no no no
Jeﬀerson/D'Hondt lower yes yes no
Webster/Sainte-Laguë mostly yes yes no
Huntingdon-Hill/EP no yes yes no
Leximin no no no yes
3 Choosing Methods
The reason for looking at the various properties has been to be able to eval-
uate the diﬀerent methods. In Table 2 we present some of the known com-
parison results about these methods. Apportionment has a long history in
the United States and the method has already been altered several times.
Over the years many new states joined, populations increased dramatically
and correspondingly, the House was expanded, too, and we have seen prop-
erties violated several times. While apart from the initial use of the Jeﬀerson
method, Hamilton and Webster were used together, Hamilton was found to
exhibit both the Alabama paradox, when house-monotonicity is violated, the
population monotonicity and also the new state paradox that we did not dis-
cuss here. As a result the method has been replaced by the Huntingdon-Hill,
or Equal Proportions method that is still used today.
Even if we treat the Venice property separately, notice that there is no
method that would satisfy all other requirements. Balinski and Young (1975)
introduced the so-called Quota method that is house-monotonic and fulﬁlls
the quota property as well, but proved that no method that is free from
both the Alabama and the population paradoxes satisﬁes quota (Balinski
and Young, 1982). On the other hand Biró et al. (2015) have shown that
the Venice property is not compatible with any of the remaining properties.
Notice that the result is also true if we look at admissible departures only.
For a low enough admissible departure the same counterexamples can be pre-
sented. This means that the recommendation of Venice Commission (2002)
inherently violates quota and the monotonicity properties.
When we say that a method violates a property we mean that there
exists an apportionment problem where the given property is violated. These
counterexamples are sometimes artiﬁcial. They may for instance rely on
symmetries that are extremely unlikely in real life. In the following we look
at real apportionment problems gathered from countries all over the world.
In the next couple of sections we test the properties on this real data set.
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3.1 Bounds on the Maximum Departure
Let us ﬁx an apportionment problem (p, H). Obviously di is the smallest if
state i receives either its lower or upper quota, although it matters which one.
Note that the closest integer to the respective share does not always yield the
smallest diﬀerence from the average. Let us elaborate on this relationship a
bit further.
Let li =
⌊
pi
P
H
⌋
and ui =
⌈
pi
P
H
⌉
, respectively, denote the lower and upper
quotas of state i and let βi and ωi denote the minimum and maximum dif-
ference achievable for state i when it gets the lower or upper integer part of
its respective share. The maximum of the βi values, denoted by β (for best
case), is a natural lower bound on the maximum departure for any appor-
tionment, which satisﬁes the Hare-quota property. Similarly the maximum
of the ωi values, denoted by ω (for worst case), is an upper bound for any
apportionment which satisﬁes the Hare-quota. Formally:
βi = min
(∣∣∣∣ pili − AA
∣∣∣∣, ∣∣∣∣ piui − AA
∣∣∣∣), β = maxi∈N βi. (3)
ωi = max
(∣∣∣∣ pili − AA
∣∣∣∣, ∣∣∣∣ piui − AA
∣∣∣∣), ω = maxi∈N ωi. (4)
Suppose we would like to minimize the diﬀerences from the average con-
stituency size. We calculate the standard quota for every state and start
rounding it up or down depending on which one yields a smaller diﬀerence.
Unfortunately the resulting allotment is infeasible if we have distributed too
few or too many seats. The best case scenario is when the allotted number
of seats add up to the House size. In such cases we can guarantee that the
departure is not bigger than β. Even if some states are rounded in the wrong
direction, β is achievable if we rounded the critical states well. The worst
case scenario is when the critical states are rounded in the wrong direction, in
such cases the diﬀerence will be ω. Note that it is always possible to allocate
the seats in such way that the apportionment satisﬁes the quota property,
hence if the goal is to minimize the diﬀerences from the average then ω is
achievable even in the worst case.
In contrast the maximum diﬀerence α can be implemented by the Leximin
Method, By design, β ≤ α ≤ ω, thus the Leximin Method always yields
an apportionment that falls within these bounds. Somewhat surprisingly,
empirical data shows that divisor methods, which are known to violate the
quota property never exceed these bounds either (see Figures 1 and 2).
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Figure 1: Apportionment over Belgian regions. Leximin coincides with β; EP,
Webster are near. Ironically D'Hondt performs poorly reaching ω several times.
ω = 1
ω = 0.5
ω = 0.333
Figure 2: Apportionment over Irish counties. Leximin performs best, then EP,
Webster, but all struggle to evenly distribute seats due to regular county sizes.
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Leximin EP Jeﬀ/D'Hondt Adams Webster
Largest county (Budapest) 27 1 74 67 0
2nd largest county (Pest) 4 0 17 21 0
Elsewhere 0 0 0 0 0
Table 3: Number of quota failures based on Hungarian constituency data when
House size varies between 100 and 200.
Leximin EP Jeﬀ/D'Hondt Adams Webster
Largest state (California) 112 2 201 201 0
2nd largest state (Texas) 30 0 198 192 0
3rd largest state (New York) 12 0 120 67 0
4th largest state (Florida) 6 0 105 21 0
Elsewhere 0 0 19 24 0
Table 4: Number of quota failures based on US constituency data when House
size varies between 335 and 535 (that is current House size ±100).
3.2 Monotonicity vs. Quota vs. Maximum Departure
The Leximin Method fails to be monotonic because it focuses solely on re-
ducing the maximum departure from the average constituency size. In eﬀect
this means that the Leximin Method will reallocate seats from big states to
small ones if the resulting apportionment has smaller departure. Large states
with many seats serve as puﬀers where excess seats can be allocated or seats
can be acquired if there are needed elsewhere as these changes do not aﬀect
the average size of constituencies dramatically. For the exact same reasons
the Leximin Method violates quota as well.
Divisor methods are all immune from the Alabama paradox. The reason
is clear: by enlarging the House, the price of a seat decreases, thus each
state can aﬀord more. Similarly, divisor methods are immune from both the
population- and new state paradoxes. In fact if a method avoids the popu-
lation paradox it must be a divisor method (Balinski and Young, 1982). As
a consequence divisor methods sometime fail to produce quota apportion-
ments. Interestingly, quota failures just as for leximin aﬀect only large states
(see Tables 3 and 4).
Quota failures are more common for problems with substantially diﬀer-
ent state/county sizes. In case of Hungary the capital Budapest has eight
times more voters than the smallest county, Nógrád. In comparison the Irish
administrative regions do not vary that much. The population ratio of the
largest (Donegal) and the smallest (South-West Cork) county is only 1.83.
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Even on a broader range of House sizes (50-250) the Adams, EP and Webster
methods do not violate the quota property and the leximin and the Jeﬀer-
son/D'Hondt methods only violate it 3 times each (again at the two largest
counties).
The leximin and EP methods, although conceptually very diﬀerent, in
practice tend to produce similar apportionments. They coincide for the ap-
portionment problems in Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Luxemburg
and Portugal, diﬀer for the US House of Representatives and in England by
1 and 2 seats respectively. This small diﬀerence, however, accounts for the
worse (better) departure statistic and for the (lack of) monotonicity.
The β and ω bounds indicate that proportional representation rests on
whether we can round the critical states in a good direction. Enforcing quota
ensures that the departure will not exceed ω but the additional constraint
also makes it diﬃcult to stay close to β, since it does not allow us to use
states as buﬀers to lend/borrow problematic or desperately needed seats for
critical states without creating too much inequality. What are the critical
states? Critical states are small states which are only a few times as big as
the average constituency size. It is easy to prove the following upper bounds
β ≤ β def= 1
2lsm + 1
(5)
ω ≤ ω def=
{
1
lsm
if lsm > 0,
∞ if lsm = 0.
(6)
where lsm denotes the lower integer part of the smallest state's respective
share.
li − ui p∗i β pˆi ω
0− 1 0 1 < A ∞
1− 2 4
3
A 1/3 A or 2A 1
2− 3 12
5
A 1/5 2A or 3A 1/2
3− 4 24
7
A 1/7 3A or 4A 1/3
4− 5 40
9
A 1/9 4A or 5A 1/4
5− 6 60
11
A 1/11 5A or 6A 1/5
Table 5: Critical state populations. The ﬁrst column shows the lower and upper
quotas. If state i's population is close to p∗i then βi will be close to β. If state i's
population is close to pˆi then ωi will be close to ω.
Figure 2 demonstrates the meaning of Table 5. As the House size increases
from 111 to 112 the average constituency size becomes so small that even the
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smallest county is at least twice as big as A. As a result ω drops signiﬁcantly
and never anymore exceeds 50%.
The reason why we are interested in β rather than in ω is that some
methods like the EP and Webster can reach β and the Leximin Method often
coincides with it even for a wide range of House sizes. Since β is achievable
it is a valid question where β takes its maximum and how can we lower it.
Equation 5 highlights the relationship of β and lower quota of the smallest
state. For example, if the average constituency size is suﬃciently small, less
than half of the smallest state, then the maximum departure will be less than
20% (assuming we achieve β).
The Leximin Method will coincide with β if the House size is not too
small and there are puﬀer states that enable seat reconﬁguration. That
means there are at least one or two large states.
4 Conclusion
Several alternative methods exist for the allocation of seats among states or
regions and while all these methods have the same goal, fair representation,
each approaches fairness from a diﬀerent angle. Fairness can be captured by
several incompatible properties and our interest lies in uncovering the princi-
ples that lead to one or another choice. In particular, we want to understand
the incompatibility of the quota and maximum diﬀerence properties. The
latter is a mathematical formulation of a good practice recommended by the
Venice Commission (2002) to ensure near-equal representation. The Quota
Property on the other hand puts the states ﬁrst and guarantees that the
states or regions get very close to their fair share. The conﬂict between the
two views is far from obvious, but we soon learned that fairness at the state
level contributes to larger inequalities among voters elsewhere.
The actual apportionments in certain European countries fall quite far
from both the recommendation of the Venice Commission and the method
used in the US. While the diﬀerences can, surely be attribute to the lack
of a scientiﬁc approach, certain countries introduce systematic biases, often
to counter the overrepresentation of the urban areas. Corrections are not
needed for a country with homogeneous constituencies, but if some share
common interest, voting blocks may emerge and proportionality is no longer
fair.
For instance the Spanish Congress of Deputies consists of 350 members,
but only 248 are apportioned according to the population data. Each of the
ﬁfty provinces is entitled to an initial minimum of two seats, while the cities
of Ceuta and Melilla get one each. As a result the constituencies of Teruel are
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roughly 65% smaller, Madrid's are 30% larger than the average; the vote of a
Teruelian citizen is worth nearly four times more than that of a Madrilenian.
The Danish apportionment, on the other hand, uses the classical D'Hondt
method, but based on the sum of the (1) population, (2) voting population,
and (3) 20 times the area in square kilometres (as a rural bonus) for each
region. Other countries have special clauses specifying the seat allocated to
certain states explicitly, outside the apportionment procedure. While this
is generally to ensure the fair treatment of a peripheral or underpopulated
region, favourable developments of the population often turns such measures
unnecessary or even harmful for the region. Such anomalies are very inter-
esting from both a theoretical and practical point of view, but elaborating on
them further would be beyond the limits of this paper and we present them
in a companion paper with a systematic study of apportionment methods
and practices.
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